Islam and the Theology of Power

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Islam and the Theology of Power
Anonymous
12/17/01 at 15:23:50
Islam and the Theology of Power

Khaled Abou El Fadl

(Khaled Abou El Fadl is Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Distinguished Fellow in
Islamic Law at the UCLA School of Law.)


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Mir-i-Arab Madrasa towers over Bukhara, Uzbekistan. (Burhan Ozbilici/AP
Photo)

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Since the early 1980s, commentators have argued that Islam is suffering
a crisis of identity, as the crumbling of Islamic civilization in the
modern age has left Muslims with a profound sense of alienation and
injury. Challenges confronting Muslim nations -- failures of development
projects, entrenched authoritarian regimes and the inability to respond
effectively to Israeli belligerence -- have induced deep-seated
frustration and anger that, in turn, contributed to the rise of fundamentalist
movements, or as most commentators have preferred to say, political
Islam. But most commentators have been caught off guard by the ferocity of
the acts of mass murder recently committed in New York and Washington.
The basic cruelty and moral depravity of these attacks came as a shock
not only to non-Muslims, but to Muslims as well.

The extreme political violence we call terrorism is not a simple
aberration unrelated to the political dynamics of a society. Generally,
terrorism is the quintessential crime of those who feel powerless seeking to
undermine the perceived power of a targeted group. Like many crimes of
power, terrorism is also a hate crime, for it relies on a polarized
rhetoric of belligerence toward a particular group that is demonized to
the point of being denied any moral worth. To recruit and communicate
effectively, this rhetoric of belligerence needs to tap into and exploit
an already radicalized discourse with the expectation of resonating with
the social and political frustrations of a people. If acts of terrorism
find little resonance within a society, such acts and their ideological
defenders are marginalized. But if these acts do find a degree of
resonance, terrorism becomes incrementally more acute and severe, and its
ideological justifications become progressively more radical.

Asking Why

To what extent are the September 11 attacks in the US symptomatic of
more pervasive ideological undercurrents in the Muslim world today?
Obviously, not all social or political frustrations lead to the use of
violence. While national liberation movements often resort to violence, the
recent attacks are set apart from such movements. The perpetrators did
not seem to be acting on behalf of an ethnic group or nation. They
presented no specific territorial claims or political agenda, and were not
keen to claim responsibility for their acts. One can speculate that the
perpetrators' list of grievances included persistent Israeli abuses of
Palestinians, near-daily bombings of Iraq and the presence of American
troops in the Gulf, but the fact remains that the attacks were not
followed by a list of demands or even a set of articulated goals. The
attacks exhibit a profound sense of frustration and extreme despair, rather
than a struggle to achieve clear-cut objectives.

Some commentators have viewed the underpinnings of the recent attacks
as part of a "clash of civilizations" between Western values and Islamic
culture. According to these commentators, the issue is not religious
fundamentalism or political Islam, but an essential conflict between
competing visions of morality and ethics. From this perspective, it is
hardly surprising that the terrorists do not present concrete demands, do
not have specific territorial objectives and do not rush to take
responsibility. The September 11 attacks aimed to strike at the symbols of
Western civilization, and to challenge its perceived hegemony, in the hope
of empowering and reinvigorating Islamic civilization.  

The "clash of civilizations" approach assumes, in deeply prejudiced
fashion, that puritanism and terrorism are somehow authentic expressions
of the predominant values of the Islamic tradition, and hence is a
dangerous interpretation of the present moment. But the common responses to
this interpretation, focusing on either the crisis of identity or acute
social frustration in the Muslim world, do not adequately explain the
theological positions adopted by radical Islamist groups, or how extreme
violence can be legitimated in the modern age. Further, none of these
perspectives engage the classical tradition in Islamic thought regarding
the employment of political violence, and how contemporary Muslims
reconstruct the classical tradition. How might the classical or
contemporary doctrines of Islamic theology contribute to the use of terrorism by
modern Islamic movements?

Classical Islamic Law and Political Violence

By the eleventh century, Muslim jurists had developed a sophisticated
discourse on the proper limits on the conduct of warfare, political
violence and terrorism. The Qur'an exhorted Muslims in general terms to
perform jihad by waging war against their enemies. The Qur'anic
prescriptions simply call upon Muslims to fight in the way of God, establish
justice and refrain from exceeding the limits of justice in fighting their
enemies. Muslim jurists, reflecting their historical circumstances and
context, tended to divide the world into three conceptual categories:
the abode of Islam, the abode of war and the abode of peace or
non-belligerence. These were not clear or precise categories, but generally they
connoted territories belonging to Muslims, territories belonging to
enemies and territories considered neutral or non-hostile for one reason
or another. But Muslim jurists could not agree on exactly how to define
the abode of Muslims versus the abode of others, especially when
sectarian divisions within Islam were involved, and when dealing with
conquered Muslim territories or territories where sizable Muslim minorities
resided.(1) Furthermore, Muslim jurists disagreed on the legal cause for
fighting non-Muslims. Some contended that non-Muslims are to be fought
because they are infidels, while the majority argued that non-Muslims
should be fought only if they pose a danger to Muslims. The majority of
early jurists argued that a treaty of non-aggression between Muslims
and non-Muslims ought to be limited to a ten-year term. Nonetheless,
after the tenth century an increasing number of jurists argued that such
treaties could be renewed indefinitely, or be of permanent or indefinite
duration.(2)

Importantly, Muslim jurists did not focus on the idea of just cause for
war. Other than emphasizing that if Muslim territory is attacked,
Muslims must fight back, the jurists seemed to relegate the decision to make
war or peace to political authorities. There is a considerable body of
legal writing prohibiting Muslim rulers from violating treaties,
indulging in treachery or attacking an enemy without first giving notice, but
the literature on the conditions that warrant a jihad is sparse. It is
not that the classical jurists believed that war is always justified or
appropriate; rather, they seemed to assume that the decision to wage
war is fundamentally political. However, the methods of war were the
subject of a substantial jurisprudential discourse.

Building upon the proscriptions of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim jurists
insisted that there are legal restrictions upon the conduct of war. In
general, Muslim armies may not kill women, children, seniors, hermits,
pacifists, peasants or slaves unless they are combatants. Vegetation
and property may not be destroyed, water holes may not be poisoned, and
flame-throwers may not be used unless out of necessity, and even then
only to a limited extent. Torture, mutilation and murder of hostages were
forbidden under all circumstances. Importantly, the classical jurists
reached these determinations not simply as a matter of textual
interpretation, but as moral or ethical assertions. The classical jurists spoke
from the vantage point of a moral civilization, in other words, from a
perspective that betrayed a strong sense of confidence in the normative
message of Islam. In contrast to their pragmatism regarding whether a
war should be waged, the classical jurists accepted the necessity of
moral constraints upon the way war is conducted.

An Offense Against God and Society

Muslim jurists exhibited a remarkable tolerance toward the idea of
political rebellion. Because of historical circumstances in the first three
centuries of Islam, Muslim jurists, in principle, prohibited rebellions
even against unjust rulers. At the same time, they refused to give the
government unfettered discretion against rebels. The classical jurists
argued that the law of God prohibited the execution of rebels or
needless destruction or confiscation of their property. Rebels should not be
tortured or even imprisoned if they take an oath promising to abandon
their rebellion. Most importantly, according to the majority point of
view, rebellion, for a plausible cause, is not a sin or moral infraction,
but merely a political wrong because of the chaos and civil strife that
result. This approach effectively made political rebellion a civil, and
not a religious, infraction.

The classical juristic approach to terrorism was quite different. Since
the very first century of Islam, Muslims suffered from extremist
theologies that not only rejected the political institutions of the Islamic
empire, but also refused to concede legitimacy to the juristic class.
Although not organized in a church or a single institutional structure,
the juristic class in Islam had clear and distinctive insignia of
investiture. They attended particular colleges, received training in a
particular methodology of juristic inquiry, and developed a specialized
technical language, the mastery of which became the gateway to inclusion.

Significantly, the juristic class engaged as a rule in discussion and
debate. On each point of law, there are ten different opinions and a
considerable amount of debate among the various legal schools of thought.
Various puritan theological movements in Islamic history resolutely
rejected this juristic tradition, which reveled in indeterminacy. The
hallmark of these puritan movements was an intolerant theology displaying
extreme hostility not only to non-Muslims but also to Muslims who
belonged to different schools of thought or even remained neutral. These
movements considered opponents and indifferent Muslims to have exited the
fold of Islam, and therefore legitimate targets of violence. These
groups' preferred methods of violence were stealth attacks and the
dissemination of terror in the general population.  

Muslim jurists reacted sharply to these groups, considering them
enemies of humankind. They were designated as muharibs (literally, those who
fight society). A muharib was defined as someone who attacks
defenseless victims by stealth, and spreads terror in society. They were not to
be given quarter or refuge by anyone or at any place. In fact, Muslim
jurists argued that any Muslim or non-Muslim territory sheltering such a
group is hostile territory that may be attacked by the mainstream
Islamic forces. Although the classical jurists agreed on the definition of a
muharib, they disagreed about which types of criminal acts should be
considered crimes of terror. Many jurists classified rape, armed robbery,
assassinations, arson and murder by poisoning as crimes of terror and
argued that such crimes must be punished vigorously regardless of the
motivations of the criminal. Most importantly, these doctrines were
asserted as religious imperatives. Regardless of the desired goals or
ideological justifications, the terrorizing of the defenseless was recognized
as a moral wrong and an offense against society and God.

Demise of the Classical Tradition

It is often stated that terrorism is the weapon of the weak. Notably,
classical juristic discourse was developed when Islamic civilization was
supreme, and this supremacy was reflected in the benevolent attitude of
the juristic class. Pre-modern Muslim juristic discourses navigated a
course between principled thinking and real-life pragmatic concerns and
demands. Ultimately, these jurists spoke with a sense of urgency, but
not desperation. Power and political supremacy were not their sole
pursuits.  

Much has changed in the modern age. Islamic civilization has crumbled,
and the traditional institutions that once sustained the juristic
discourse have all but vanished. The moral foundations that once mapped out
Islamic law and theology have disintegrated, leaving an unsettling
vacuum. More to the point, the juristic discourses on tolerance towards
rebellion and hostility to the use of terror are no longer part of the
normative categories of contemporary Muslims. Contemporary Muslim
discourses either give lip service to the classical doctrines without a sense
of commitment or ignore and neglect them all together.

There are many factors that contributed to this modern reality. Among
the pertinent factors is the undeniably traumatic experience of
colonialism, which dismantled the traditional institutions of civil society.
The emergence of highly centralized, despotic and often corrupt
governments, and the nationalization of the institutions of religious learning
undermined the mediating role of jurists in Muslim societies. Nearly all
charitable religious endowments became state-controlled entities, and
Muslim jurists in most Muslim nations became salaried state employees,
effectively transforming them into what may be called "court priests."
The establishment of the state of Israel, the expulsion of the
Palestinians and the persistent military conflicts in which Arab states suffered
heavy losses all contributed to a widespread siege mentality and a
highly polarized and belligerent political discourse. Perhaps most
importantly, Western cultural symbols, modes of production and social values
aggressively penetrated the Muslim world, seriously challenging inherited
values and practices, and adding to a profound sense of alienation.  

Two developments became particularly relevant to the withering away of
Islamic jurisprudence. Most Muslim nations experienced the wholesale
borrowing of civil law concepts. Instead of the dialectical and
indeterminate methodology of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, Muslim nations
opted for more centralized and often code-based systems of law. Even
Muslim modernists who attempted to reform Islamic jurisprudence were
heavily influenced by the civil law system, and sought to resist the
fluidity of Islamic law and increase its unitary and centralized character.
Not only were the concepts of law heavily influenced by the European
legal tradition, the ideologies of resistance employed by Muslims were
laden with Third World notions of national liberation and
self-determination. For instance, modern nationalistic thought exercised a greater
influence on the resistance ideologies of Muslim and Arab national
liberation movements than anything in the Islamic tradition. The Islamic
tradition was reconstructed to fit Third World nationalistic ideologies of
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism rather than the other way around.

While national liberation movements -- such as the Palestinian or
Algerian resistance -- resorted to guerrilla or non-conventional warfare,
modern day terrorism of the variety promoted by Osama bin Laden is rooted
in a different ideological paradigm. There is little doubt that
organizations such as the Jihad, al-Qaeda, Hizb al-Tahrir and Jama'at
al-Muslimin were influenced by national liberation and anti-colonialist
ideologies, but they have anchored themselves in a theology that can be
described as puritan, supremacist and thoroughly opportunistic. This theology
is the byproduct of the emergence and eventual dominance of Wahhabism,
Salafism and apologetic discourses in modern Islam.

Contemporary Puritan Islam

The foundations of Wahhabi theology were put in place by the
eighteenth-century evangelist Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in the Arabian
Peninsula. With a puritanical zeal, 'Abd al-Wahhab sought to rid Islam of
corruptions that he believed had crept into the religion. Wahhabism resisted
the indeterminacy of the modern age by escaping to a strict literalism
in which the text became the sole source of legitimacy. In this
context, Wahhabism exhibited extreme hostility to intellectualism, mysticism
and any sectarian divisions within Islam. The Wahhabi creed also
considered any form of moral thought that was not entirely dependent on the
text as a form of self-idolatry, and treated humanistic fields of
knowledge, especially philosophy, as "the sciences of the devil." According to
the Wahhabi creed, it was imperative to return to a presumed pristine,
simple and straightforward Islam, which could be entirely reclaimed by
literal implementation of the commands of the Prophet, and by strict
adherence to correct ritual practice. Importantly, Wahhabism rejected any
attempt to interpret the divine law from a historical, contextual
perspective, and treated the vast majority of Islamic history as a
corruption of the true and authentic Islam. The classical jurisprudential
tradition was considered at best to be mere sophistry. Wahhabism became very
intolerant of the long-established Islamic practice of considering a
variety of schools of thought to be equally orthodox. Orthodoxy was
narrowly defined, and 'Abd al-Wahhab himself was fond of creating long lists
of beliefs and acts which he considered hypocritical, the adoption or
commission of which immediately rendered a Muslim an unbeliever.  

In the late eighteenth century, the Al Sa'ud family united with the
Wahhabi movement and rebelled against Ottoman rule in Arabia. Egyptian
forces quashed this rebellion in 1818. Nevertheless, Wahhabi ideology was
resuscitated in the early twentieth century under the leadership of
'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud who allied himself with the tribes of Najd, in the
beginnings of what would become Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi rebellions of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were very bloody because the
Wahhabis indiscriminately slaughtered and terrorized Muslims and
non-Muslims alike. Mainstream jurists writing at the time, such as the Hanafi
Ibn 'Abidin and the Maliki al-Sawi, described the Wahhabis as a fanatic
fringe group.(3)

Wahhabism Ascendant

Nevertheless, Wahhabism survived and, in fact, thrived in contemporary
Islam for several reasons. By treating Muslim Ottoman rule as a foreign
occupying power, Wahhabism set a powerful precedent for notions of Arab
self-determination and autonomy. In advocating a return to the pristine
and pure origins of Islam, Wahhabism rejected the cumulative weight of
historical baggage. This idea was intuitively liberating for Muslim
reformers since it meant the rebirth of ijtihad, or the return to de novo
examination and determination of legal issues unencumbered by the
accretions of precedents and inherited doctrines. Most importantly, the
discovery and exploitation of oil provided Saudi Arabia with high
liquidity. Especially after 1975, with the sharp rise in oil prices, Saudi
Arabia aggressively promoted Wahhabi thought around the Muslim world. Even a
cursory examination of predominant ideas and practices reveals the
widespread influence of Wahhabi thought on the Muslim world today.

But Wahhabism did not spread in the modern Muslim world under its own
banner. Even the term "Wahhabism" is considered derogatory by its
adherents, since Wahhabis prefer to see themselves as the representatives of
Islamic orthodoxy. To them, Wahhabism is not a school of thought within
Islam, but is Islam. The fact that Wahhabism rejected a label gave it a
diffuse quality, making many of its doctrines and methodologies
eminently transferable. Wahhabi thought exercised its greatest influence not
under its own label, but under the rubric of Salafism. In their
literature, Wahhabi clerics have consistently described themselves as Salafis,
and not Wahhabis.  

Beset with Contradictions

Salafism is a creed founded in the late nineteenth century by Muslim
reformers such as Muhammad 'Abduh, al-Afghani and Rashid Rida. Salafism
appealed to a very basic concept in Islam: Muslims ought to follow the
precedent of the Prophet and his companions (al-salaf al-salih).
Methodologically, Salafism was nearly identical to Wahhabism except that
Wahhabism is far less tolerant of diversity and differences of opinion. The
founders of Salafism maintained that on all issues Muslims ought to
return to the Qur'an and the sunna (precedent) of the Prophet. In doing
so, Muslims ought to reinterpret the original sources in light of modern
needs and demands, without being slavishly bound to the interpretations
of earlier Muslim generations.

As originally conceived, Salafism was not necessarily
anti-intellectual, but like Wahhabism, it did tend to be uninterested in history. By
emphasizing a presumed golden age in Islam, the adherents of Salafism
idealized the time of the Prophet and his companions, and ignored or
demonized the balance of Islamic history. By rejecting juristic precedents
and undervaluing tradition, Salafism adopted a form of egalitarianism
that deconstructed any notions of established authority within Islam.
Effectively, anyone was considered qualified to return to the original
sources and speak for the divine will.  By liberating Muslims from the
tradition of the jurists, Salafism contributed to a real vacuum of
authority in contemporary Islam. Importantly, Salafism was founded by Muslim
nationalists who were eager to read the values of modernism into the
original sources of Islam. Hence, Salafism was not necessarily
anti-Westerj. In fact, its founders strove to project contemporary institutions
such as democracy, constitutions or socialism into the foundational texts,
and to justify the modern nation-state within Islam.

The liberal age of Salafism came to an end in the 1960s. After 1975,
Wahhabism was able to rid itself of its extreme intolerance, and
proceeded to coopt Salafism until the two became practically indistinguishable.
Both theologies imagined a golden age within Islam, entailing a belief
in a historical utopia that can be reproduced in contemporary Islam.
Both remained uninterested in critical historical inquiry and responded
to the challenge of modernity by escaping to the secure haven of the
text. Both advocated a form of egalitarianism and anti-elitism to the
point that they came to consider intellectualism and rational moral insight
to be inaccessible and, thus, corruptions of the purity of the Islamic
message. Wahhabism and Salafism were beset with contradictions that
made them simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic and infested both creeds
(especially in the 1980s and 1990s) with a kind of supremacist thinking
that prevails until today.

Between Apologetics and Supremacy

The predominant intellectual response to the challenge of modernity in
Islam has been apologetics. Apologetics consisted of an effort by a
large number of commentators to defend the Islamic system of beliefs from
the onslaught of Orientalism, Westernization and modernity by
simultaneously emphasizing the compatibility and supremacy of Islam. Apologists
responded to the intellectual challenges coming from the West by
adopting pietistic fictions about the Islamic traditions. Such fictions
eschewed any critical evaluation of Islamic doctrines, and celebrated the
presumed perfection of Islam. A common apologist argument was that any
meritorious or worthwhile modern institution was first invented by
Muslims. According to the apologists, Islam liberated women, created a
democracy, endorsed pluralism, protected human rights and guaranteed social
security long before these institutions ever existed in the West. These
concepts were not asserted out of critical understanding or ideological
commitment, but primarily as a means of resisting Western hegemony and
affirming self-worth. The main effect of apologetics, however, was to
contribute to a sense of intellectual self-sufficiency that often
descended into moral arrogance. To the extent that apologetics were
habit-forming, it produced a culture that eschewed self-critical and
introspective insight, and embraced the projection of blame and a fantasy-like
level of confidence.

In many ways, the apologetic response was fundamentally centered on
power. Its main purpose was not to integrate particular values within
Islamic culture, but to empower Islam against its civilizational rival.
Muslim apologetics tended to be opportunistic and rather unprincipled,
and, in fact, they lent support to the tendency among many intellectuals
and activists to give precedence to the logic of pragmatism over any
other competing demands. Invoking the logic of necessity or public
interest to justify courses of action, at the expense of moral imperatives,
became common practice. Effectively, apologists got into the habit of
paying homage to the presumed superiority of the Islamic tradition, but
marginalized this idealistic image in everyday life.

Post-1970s Salafism adopted many of the premises of the apologetic
discourse, but it also took these premises to their logical extreme.
Instead of simple apologetics, Salafism responded to feelings of
powerlessness and defeat with uncompromising and arrogant symbolic displays of
power, not only against non-Muslims, but also against Muslim women.
Fundamentally, Salafism, which by the 1970s had become a virulent puritan
theology, further anchored itself in the confident security of texts.
Nonetheless, contrary to the assertions of its proponents, Salafism did not
necessarily pursue objective or balanced interpretations of Islamic
texts, but primarily projected its own frustrations and aspirations upon
the text. Its proponents no longer concerned themselves with coopting or
claiming Western institutions as their own, but defined Islam as the
exact antithesis of the West, under the guise of reclaiming the true and
real Islam. Whatever the West was perceived to be, Islam was understood
to be the exact opposite.  

Alienation from Tradition

Of course, neither Wahhabism nor Salafism is represented by some formal
institution. They are theological orientations and not structured
schools of thought. Nevertheless, the lapsing and bonding of the theologies
of Wahhabism and Salafism produced a contemporary orientation that is
anchored in profound feelings of defeat, frustration and alienation, not
only from modern institutions of power, but also from the Islamic
heritage and tradition. The outcome of the apologist, Wahhabi and Salafi
legacies is a supremacist puritanism that compensates for feelings of
defeat, disempowerment and alienation with a distinct sense of
self-righteous arrogance vis-à-vis the nondescript "other" -- whether the other is
the West, non-believers in general or even Muslims of a different sect
and Muslim women. In this sense, it is accurate to describe this
widespread modern trend as supremacist, for it sees the world from the
perspective of stations of merit and extreme polarization.

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, several commentators posed
the question of whether Islam somehow encourages violence and terrorism.
Some commentators argued that the Islamic concept of jihad or the
notion of the dar al-harb (the abode of war) is to blame for the
contemporary violence. These arguments are anachronistic and Orientalist. They
project Western categories and historical experiences upon a situation
that is very particular and fairly complex. One can easily locate an
ethical discourse within the Islamic tradition that is uncompromisingly
hostile to acts of terrorism. One can also locate a discourse that is
tolerant toward the other, and mindful of the dignity and worth of all human
beings. But one must also come to terms with the fact that supremacist
puritanism in contemporary Islam is dismissive of all moral norms or
ethical values, regardless of the identity of their origins or
foundations. The prime and nearly singular concern is power and its symbols.
Somehow, all other values are made subservient.

ENDNOTES

(1) Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The
Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the
Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries," Journal of Islamic Law and Society 22/1
(1994).

(2) Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into
Classical Sources," The Muslim World 89 (1999).

(3) Muhammad Amin Ibn 'Abidin, Hashiyat Radd al-Muhtar, vol. VI (Cairo:
Mustafa al-Babi, 1966), p. 413; Ahmad al-Sawi, Hashiyat al-Sawi 'ala
Tafsir al-Jalalayn, vol. III (Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi,
n.d.), pp. 307-308. See also Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins and Objectives of
Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850," Journal of the American Oriental
Society 113/3 (1993).


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