A R C H I V E S
Madinat al-Muslimeen Islamic Message Board
| Shoora And Democracy |
|---|
| AbdulJalil |
| 04/20/03 at 17:12:14 |
| Assalamu Alaikum http://www.islam-canada.com/arrisalah/featurearticles/shoora.htm |
| Re: Shoora And Democracy |
|---|
| Barr |
| 04/22/03 at 01:58:21 |
| [slm] Thanks, akhi :) U might be interested to read this article by Tariq Ramadan on Shura & Democracy. He presents some interesting perspectives, mashaALlah. http://www.tariq-ramadan.org/document.asp?id=10&fichier=Shura [size=3] The Notion of Shûrâ Shûrâ or Democrary ? [/size] ................ <snip>...... Shûrâ or Democracy? "There is no democracy in Islam"; "Islam is opposed to democratic principles." Such statements have been made by Muslims and some researchers have registered them. Hence, a thought which comes to disturb the clarity of such a formulation may appear dubious. If, incidentally, one dares to assert that things are a little bit more complex than this, one may be accused of throwing a shadow where there is so much light. Therefore, an explanation imposes itself. Many Western researchers and intellectuals, regardless of how good their intention is, make the mistake of apprehending the domains of the religious and the political, at the same time as their articulation and interaction, according to points of reference which are theirs and in the light of their own history. In the same way, the terms used take the meaning of their historical evolution from which they cannot be subtracted. It is impossible to stop at the "actual" meaning of terms for one risks committing serious methodological errors. This happens by starting, for example, to compare that which is incomparable within two points of reference and two different cultures. To recall this is not tantamount to sidestepping the custom. It is rather purifying turbid water by refusing to have a dispute about expressions when it is question of evaluating the respective principles of structuration in the political field. Numerous Muslim intellectuals have not been immune from such clumsiness. They express, without any great anxiety for being well understood, Islamic specificities with a terminological arsenal which is liable to produce damaging shifts of meaning. Out of reaction against the universal, universalist pretension of the West, they combat notions for what they represent in the rapport between the West and Islam and not in what they are in themselves. This to the extent that this criticism, whose source we can well understand, ends up by clouding over the Islamic points of view themselves. As for concepts of "democracy," "human rights" and "freedom of expression," it is appropriate, all the same in this discussion, to distinguish between normative definitions and ideological and political tools.(16) In Part One of this book, we revealed some bases of the Islamic concept of the universe and man: this allowed us to arrange, with more clarity, the domains of Revelation, tradition and rational research in order to show how their interactions were elaborated below. When establishing a strict comparison with points of reference proper to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, one realises that there are some significant differences between the two concepts,(17) and this despite the apparent similarities. The history of Islamic civilisation confirms that there exists a primal difference between the elements which have given meaning to its internal dynamic and that which, in the West, has produced the phenomenon of secularisation, at least since the Renaissance. This is not only a simple historical acknowledged fact, rather there exists a difference of concept in the rapport with the Creator, and in the perception of the universe and man. The latter's social thought is inevitably oriented by the holistic vision which is implied in it. The contrary of this would be strange indeed.(18) To speak of political organisation around the idea of shura and looking for points of anchorage with democracy requires first that we speak, even if succinctly, about the philosophies and systems of values which found these projects. In order to do so, let us go back to those categories we have already talked about and which render our reflection more explicit. It can be a question of a parable, that which engages the proprietor and the gerent.(19) What can straightaway mislead us is that both in the Judaeo-Christian tradition as in the Islamic concept this parable is eloquent.(20) God, the Proprietor, has rights over the universe and man, who is the gerent. Certainly, but the comparison, barely started, must stop and loses all pertinence if it goes beyond this threshold of this consideration of role. In fact, in analysing the roles attributed to the actions of this parable, all is disclosed differently. Western history is marked by the way in which it represents the rapport with God through the institutionalisation of its terrestrial Church. The sphere of the religious was, thus, founded on authority and dogma. The Church, strong with the powers it had, acted as if it retained not only gerency but also property of the world and reality. For a long time it opposed science, rationality, and free thought. The process of secularisation is very clearly the process by which the gerent claimed his rights after being long suppressed by the authority of the church. He wanted, as he was later to liberate one by one, the domains of thought and management of the world from dogmatic tutelage. Here, the gerent is opposed to the Proprietor, or to the one who represents him, and will go as far as willingly getting rid of Him.(21) From now on, the gerent runs things without the Proprietor. He fixes norms, establishes values and develops all the means he is in need of. If God remains "useful" for "private" questions concerning the meaning of life, marriage or death, He, nevertheless, never enters into consideration as regard the running of the city. Here, nothing is imposed and everything is discussed and discussible. Moral law may well be in us, but the sky full of stars above our heads remains silent.(22) The gerent is from now on responsible for the whole management. The democratic principle is, in the domain of social organisation, the result of this same process. It is founded on the idea that nothing should be imposed upon men except that which men decide amongst themselves, by majority, in the mirror of only rationality which is from now on normative. This concept of liberty was formed against authority and cannot seem real unless it is total. God and the sacred are outside the world, and the disenchantment of the latter seems to be, from the beginning, programmed.(23) The gerent is absolutely free; that is to say, the gerent is the proprietor. When Muslim theologians or intellectuals are opposed to the idea of "democracy", it is an opposition to the philosophy which it implies that they are expressing. Everything in the basic concept of life, man and his destiny; everything in the history of this civilisation is constructed around the presence of the Proprietor who invests the three spheres of the human. He gives meaning to the fact of being, He exposes the means to be with the Being. Finally, he prescribes the orientations to which man must remain faithful in history. The Proprietor is present by means of a Book and a human example - the Prophet (peace be upon him) - and not by means of an institution or an incarnation. Man finds therein a very encompassing concept of the religious, a relationship with the sacred which is both intimate and vast, and also a permanent, rational exigency. God, the Proprietor of the heavens and earth, indicates the moral norms of action and the general orientation of their achievement. He has entrusted gerents of all men at all times with calling upon all the qualities of their humanity, intelligence and reason. This in order to give shape to this teaching. Here, authority does not suppress, it awakens and stimulates. Nonetheless, one cannot do without this authority. The specificity of the Islamic concept is here entirely accessible. God does not require anything from man which is against his humanity. The latter must think, act, undertake and manage according to his nature but always in acknowledgement of the rights of the Proprietor. This acknowledgement may take diverse forms according to time and place. However, it always remains nourished by the interpretation of the sources of which no one can claim the monopoly of comprehension. The process which liberated the gerent of all tutelage in Western history does not have its counterpart in the history of Islamic civilisation. In the latter, research and experimental and human sciences were developed in the name of religion and faith, not against them. On the contrary, the proprietor required from the gerent that he should seek understanding and always act more. His liberty was not supposed to be the expression of opposition but rather the testimony of a responsibility that he carries and acknowledges before the Creator. Such a concept of liberty differs from that which we have spoken about above. There cannot be total liberty which would deny his own reality, as well as the bases of the relationship between the Creator and men. There cannot be a dogmatic authority which would likewise deny the responsibility of man before God. The way lies between these two extremes and the principle of the organisation of shura is born from this concept of man. It is a Revelation as it is a Messenger. It is these two sources which convey to man the exigencies of the Proprietor who, in matter of political organisation as in all other domains, does not stop only at the details. Management is incumbent upon the men who must read, interpret, discuss, consult with one another, oppose one another and, finally, elaborate a project about which we can say it is a test of their liberty. This test, when it is lived in constant remembrance of divine exigencies, gratitude, respect and justice, is the translation of the meaning of rabbaniyya which we have already discussed. It is wanting to be a human being without obliviousness of God. It is knowing oneself to be a gerent, albeit free, but still only a gerent. The two concepts are, without a doubt, basically different, and it is necessary to know the nature of these divergences. Yet, it remains that one must avoid enunciating conclusions hastily, two of which appear to us to be erroneous. The first consists in thinking that these differences are, in short, due to different rhythms of evolution in history. Thus, it is asserted, without turning a hair, that the "progresses" which allowed real autonomy of thought in the West are the expression of a greater "development". Hence, the Islamic concept with this authority, which is always paraded by God -Proprietor, is the expression of backwardness in a culture which has not developed sufficiently, one which could not accede to modernity. "Soon, with our help, Muslims will evolve in the right direction and their idea of religion will resemble ours. They will be free by means of the same freedom as ours". Such is the reasoning, and how dangerous it is, which we increasingly hear in certain interreligious dialogues or in political and cultural discussions. With a pronounced condescendence, we recognise, in the formulations of Muslims, certain accents of medieval thought which we have fortunately passed, and of which, it is hoped that, for the future of the world, the world of Islam will be able to liberate itself. As the West did in history, concepts, values and progress appear insidiously as the norm of the good. Those who think different are way behind; or else they think badly, it all depends. For asserting one's identity one has a choice between walking quicker or "refraining" oneself. Cultural pluralism, in many respects, seems to have limits. The second shortcoming consists of maintaining that if the differences are such, it is, therefore, because we find ourselves in the face of a conflict whose aspects are irreducible. On account of the nature of the prevailing concept and respective histories, we can but notice what seems to be conveyed by no other term except conflict.(24) As for that which concerns the organisation of the political, it is asserted that nothing which is Islamic is democratic, because at the end the democratic ideal does not find an echo in the foundation of Muslim's points of reference. One again asks does one have to choose either Islam or democracy? We shall make the reprehensible economy of analysing things in their respective context in order to disengage, behind terms and points of reference, the principles which orientate the organisation of the city. Once the differences of concept which orientate the running of the political are understood well, we shall find that the principles of shura echo many elements of economic rationality, at least in four respects: The principles of managing pluralism .. click to the link above for more of the article. |
| 04/22/03 at 01:59:29 |
| Barr |
Madinat al-Muslimeen Islamic Message Board |